



There was no legislation relevant to unjustified enrichment
during the period under review.
CASE LAW
Nel v Jonker [2011] ZAWCHC 5 (17 February 2011) an unre-
ported judgment discussed in 2011 Annual Survey 1257 and
which dealt with maintenance paid in respect of a child which
was later shown to be unrelated to the plaintiff, and the condictio
indebiti , has in fact now been reported as MN v AJ 2013 (3) SA
26 (WCC).
CLAIM IN RESPECT OF MONEY OR PROPERTY TRANSFERRED UNDER AN
ILLEGAL AGREEMENT (CONDICTIO OB TURPEM VEL INIUSTAM CAUSAM)
Whether a claim in unjustified enrichment constitutes property for the
purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996
National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA
1 (CC) is the first decision of the Constitutional Court to deal with
the law of enrichment. Its finding that the concept of property
recognised in section 25(1) of the Bill of Rights also encom-
passes personal claims, including claims arising in enrichment,
has profound implications for this area of law.
O, the first respondent, was a Namibian farmer. In 2009 he lent
his friend, B, the second respondent, R7 million for the purpose of
property development in Cape Town. O was not a registered
credit provider as required by section 40 read with section 42(1)
of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (‘NCA’). When it appeared
that B was unable to meet his obligations, O applied for the
sequestration of B’s estate in the Western Cape High Court at
Cape Town. The court raised concerns about the applicable
provisions of the NCA and counsel for O subsequently amended
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his notice of motion to include a challenge to the constitutionality
of section 89(5). This resulted in the joinder of the National Credit
Regulator (applicant), the Minister of Finance (the third respon-
dent) and the Minister of Trade and Industry (the fourth respon-
dent) as parties to the proceedings.
According to section 89(5) of the NCA,
If a credit agreement is unlawful in terms of this section, despite any
provision of common law, any other legislation or any provision of an
agreement to the contrary, a court must order that —
(a) the credit agreement is void as from the date the agreement was
entered into;
(b) the credit provider must refund to the consumer any money paid
by the consumer under that agreement to the credit provider, with
interest calculated —
(i) at the rate set out in that agreement; and
(ii) for the period from the date on which the consumer paid the
money to the credit provider, until the date the money is
refunded to the consumer; and
(c) all the purported rights of the credit provider under that credit
agreement to recover any money paid or goods delivered to, or on
behalf of, the consumer in terms of that agreement are either —
(i) cancelled, unless the court concludes that doing so in the
circumstances would unjustly enrich the consumer; or
(ii) forfeit to the State, if the court concludes that cancelling
those rights in the circumstances would unjustly enrich the
consumer.
The High Court found that section 89(5)(c) was inconsistent
with the rights recognised in section 25(1) of the Constitution,
according to which: ‘No one may be deprived of property except
in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit
arbitrary deprivation of property.’ This was because it denied an
unregistered credit provider the right to restitution of money lent
without affording a court the discretion to consider whether
restitution would be just and equitable. Accordingly, the High
Court declared the provision to be constitutionally invalid. The
National Credit Regulator (‘NCR’) appealed against the declara-
tion.
The Constitutional Court (per Van der Westhuizen J; Mogoeng
CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Khampepe J, Nkabinde J and Skweyiya J
concurring) confirmed the High Court’s order. Van der Westhui-
zen J began by reviewing the common-law context of section
89(5)(c). The appropriate claim to recover a transfer made in
pursuance of an illegal agreement was the condictio ob turpem
vel iniustam causam. In order to succeed in this restitutionary
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claim, the plaintiff must be free of turpitude and show that he had
not acted dishonourably; this was the par delictum rule. However,
since Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 the courts have been
prepared to relax the par delictum rule, in order to prevent
injustice or to satisfy the requirements of public policy, by taking
into account considerations of fairness. The rule was thus not an
absolute bar to a claim in restitution.
Where, as in this case, a credit provider, ignorant of the
requirement to register, unwittingly entered into an unlawful credit
agreement, there could not be said to be substantial (if any)
turpitude on his part. Therefore, according to the common law, a
plaintiff in such a case would be permitted to recover his
performance. But there seemed to be little room for judicial
discretion under section 89(5)(c). It appeared to provide that the
rights of the credit provider to recover money paid or goods
delivered to the consumer must either be ‘cancelled’ or forfeited
to the state if the consumer would be unjustly enriched by
cancellation, regardless of turpitude or other factors relevant to a
fairness or public-policy inquiry.
In fact, several alternative interpretations of section 89(5)(c)
had been proposed. It had been argued on behalf of the NCR
that section 89(5)(c)(ii) did not automatically come into operation
if the court concluded that cancellation of the credit provider’s
right to restitution would unjustly enrich the consumer, and that
the provision could be construed as giving the court a discretion
to refrain from cancelling the right — for example in light of the
level of turpitude or blameworthiness on the part of the credit
provider. On the other hand, it was the view of Cameron J that the
phrase ‘rights . . . under that credit agreement’ in section 89(5)(c)
was critical; that since the credit provider’s enrichment claim did
not arise from the credit agreement, it was not comprised within
the provision; indeed, the provision was meaningless and without
effect. These interpretations were attractive in that they avoided a
finding of constitutional invalidity. But the interpretation proposed
by the NCR was not reasonably permitted by the ‘either . . . or’
wording of section 89(5)(c). Nor was the interpretation proposed
by Cameron J a plausible one; indeed, read in that way, the
provision would constitute a patent drafting error.
Before constitutional compliance can be evaluated, a court must
attribute a meaning to a provision. If more than one meaning is
reasonably plausible, the one resulting in constitutional compliance
must be chosen. But if the interpretation that emerges from the
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wording and context results in constitutional invalidity a court has to
make a finding of unconstitutionality’ (para [42]).
Despite the unclear and inaccurate language of section 89(5)(c),
it was not so vague as to be unconstitutional on that basis alone.
The most plausible interpretation of the provision remained that
attributed to it by the High Court: it accorded with what were
clearly the aims of the provision; took account of the context of
the problematic phrase ‘under that credit agreement’, especially
the words ‘to recover any money paid or goods delivered’ and
the repeated phrase ‘unjustly enrich’ in section 89(5)(c)(i) and
(ii); and did not unduly strain its wording.
However, that conclusion meant that the provision might after
all be found to be inconsistent with the Constitution. The next
question to arise was whether section 89(5)(c) dealt with property
for the purposes of section 25(1). Constitutional jurisprudence
accepted that deprivation of ownership of corporeal property
constituted deprivation for the purposes of section 25(1), but the
court had not specifically found that personal rights emanating
from contract, delict or enrichment constituted property for the
purposes of that section. In the context of this case it was logical
and realistic to recognise the right to restitution of money paid
arising from unjustified enrichment as property under section
25(1). Such recognition would be in accordance with develop-
ments in other jurisdictions. Intangible property was of primary
importance in modern-day society, and the concept of property
should not be so narrowly interpreted as to diminish the worth of
the protection given by section 25.
Further, it was clear that the outright denial of O’s enrichment
claim by statute amounted to an arbitrary deprivation for the
purposes of section 25(1). A deprivation was considered arbitrary
when the law failed to provide sufficient reason for it, or when it
was procedurally unfair: First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wes-
bank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & another;
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). Whether there was sufficient reason would
be determined with reference to: the relationship between the
means employed and the ends sought by the legislative scheme;
the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the
nature of the property; as well as the extent of the deprivation in
respect of that property. Whereas it had been argued that the
requirement of procedural fairness was satisfied in this case by
virtue of the possibility of adjudication by a court, this argument
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was defeated by the fact that the court was denied any discretion
to determine a just and equitable order: cf Mohunram & another v
National Director of Public Prosecutions & another (Law Review
Project as Amicus curiae) 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC). Although the
court was sympathetic to the objects of the provision, namely to
protect the public against unscrupulous money lenders, and
specifically to deter unregistered credit providers from advanc-
ing credit to consumers outside the regulatory framework, these
objects did not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation
embodied in this provision. Given that the extent of deprivation in
this case was far reaching, the purpose should have been clearly
stated, and the means chosen to accomplish it narrowly framed.
In fact the means chosen were disproportionate to the purpose.
It had been argued that even if the denial of O’s enrichment
claim by section 89(5)(c) of the NCA amounted to an arbitrary
deprivation for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution,
nevertheless it constituted a permissible limitation of the section
25(1) right. However, it was unclear whether an arbitrary depriva-
tion of property could ever constitute a reasonable and justifiable
limitation in the context of an open and democratic society, as
required by the limitation clause in section 36(1). Many of the
factors employed in the context of the arbitrariness test yielded
the same conclusion in the context of the limitation inquiry.
Section 36(1)(d) specifically required that attention be given to
the relation between the limitation and its purpose: laws impact-
ing on constitutional rights were not permitted to use dispropor-
tionate means to achieve their purposes. Furthermore, section
36(1)(e) required that the availability of less restrictive means be
considered. The common-law regime clearly constituted a less
restrictive means of achieving the same ends: in particular, the
failure of section 89(5)(c) to distinguish between credit providers
who intentionally exploited consumers and those who failed to
register because of ignorance, lending money to a friend, was
disproportionate. Section 136 of the NCA also made provision for
a consumer to bring a complaint to the NCR, which could in turn
refer the complaint to the National Consumer Tribunal, a body
empowered to impose fines on credit providers. The foregoing of
interest due under an unlawful credit agreement was yet another
means of achieving the aims of the NCA less restrictive than that
employed by section 89(5)(c). Therefore, section 89(5)(c) of the
NCA was inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution and
consequently invalid. No suspension of the order of invalidity was
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necessary, nor would reading-in be appropriate. It was prefer-
able for the legislature to address this problematic provision
comprehensively. In the meantime, the common-law position
regarding unlawful contracts prevails.
Cameron J (Froneman J and Jafta J concurring) dissented
from this conclusion, declining to confirm the High Court’s order
of invalidity.
The route the main judgment takes lies along a path that requires the
Court to ignore plain words in the provision that are central to it. In my
view, it is simpler, and truer to our task of interpretation, not to ignore
the words, but to take them to mean what they say (para [93]).
If one takes the language the legislator has enacted seriously, as we
must, the plain meaning of the provision is that the unregistered credit
provider’s purported rights under the credit agreement to recover
what has been transferred to the borrower must either be cancelled or
forfeited. On its own terms, this is not incoherent. . . . The difficulty, of
course, is that the statute itself ordains that the credit agreement is
void from the moment it was concluded. So, by the legislator’s own
logic, there cannot be any rights of recovery under the agreement
(para [102]).
This case, in my respectful view, signals the limits of cooperative
effort in giving meaning to ill-chosen words. To virtually ignore the
wording of the provision, and then find it constitutionally bad, seems to
me an unnecessary dissonance. . . . There is then no particular
constitutional imperative to squeeze a meaning from the provision.
Rather, we must accept the words of the provision for what they say,
even at the cost of accepting that the provision is ineffectual. It is
better, in my view, to acknowledge the drafting error, and to leave
Parliament to correct it (para [105]).
National Credit Regulator v Opperman & others constitutes a
watershed moment in the evolution of the South African law of
enrichment. In terms of section 8(3) of the Constitution: ‘When
applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic
person . . . a court in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must
apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that
legislation does not give effect to that right; and may develop
rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the
limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).’ In terms of section
39(2): ‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’:
see Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938
(CC); S v Thebus 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) paras [23]–[32]; Anton
Fagan ‘The secondary role of the spirit, purport and objects of the
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Bill of Rights in the common law’s development’ (2010) 127 South
African Law Journal 611. However, until now the implications of
the Bill of Rights for the law of enrichment have been unclear, at
least insofar as its potential for broad, systematic impact is
concerned: see eg Daniel Visser Unjustified Enrichment (2008)
24–26; Jacques du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified
Enrichment (2012) 17–22. Unlike other areas of South African
private law such as property and delict, there is no primary right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights to which the law of enrichment
obviously gives expression and against which its constitutionality
can obviously be tested. Consequently, the finding of the Consti-
tutional Court that the concept of property recognised in section
25(1) also embodies personal claims, including claims arising in
enrichment, has profound implications for this area of law. On the
concept of property in the Constitution see, eg AJ Van der Walt
Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) chapter 3, cited with
approval in the judgment (para [63]).
Also worthy of note is the brief discussion of the difference
between the terms ‘unjust enrichment’ and ‘unjustified enrich-
ment’ in the judgment of Van der Westhuizen J (paras [23], [24]).
‘Linguistically there appears to be some difference between
‘‘unjust’’ and ‘‘unjustified’’. The first refers to the concept of justice,
or fairness, whereas the second normally means the absence of
justification, in this case legal justification for the enrichment.’
Here Van der Westhuizen J cited Francesco Giglio ‘A systematic
approach to ‘‘unjust’’ and ‘‘unjustified’’ enrichment’ (2003) 23
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 455. However, Van der Westhui-
zen J concluded that the two terms appeared to be used
synonymously in South African law. The choice of terminology in
the Act (‘unjust enrichment’) was therefore not significant.
Claim in respect of money transferred under an unlawful and fraudulent
investment scheme
In Trustees, Estate Whitehead v Dumas & another 2013 (3) SA
331 (SCA), D, the applicant at first instance, was the victim of an
unlawful and fraudulent Ponzi scheme operated by W. Acting on
the strength of a misrepresentation by an agent of W, D instructed
his bank, First National Bank, to pay R3 million into W’s account at
Absa Bank. D understood from the agent that the money would
remain his property until he concluded a contract with W a few
days later. However, W had in fact already been arrested for fraud
in the United Kingdom, and so the planned meeting between D
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and W never took place. On learning of W’s arrest five days later,
D instructed his bank to reverse the transfer. Acting on his
instructions, FNB wrote to Absa requesting that the money be put
on hold, and no transactions were made from the account
thereafter. The account had a balance of approximately R3,3
million, while a second account, also held by W at ABSA, had a
balance of almost R5 million. However, a few days after that W’s
estate had been provisionally sequestrated, and pursuant to an
order of court, the money in both accounts was transferred into
the trust account of C, a firm of attorneys, pending the appoint-
ment of trustees. In due course trustees were appointed and the
money was paid over to a trust account operated by them. On the
following day D instituted a vindicatory application for the return
of the money. Subsequently he altered the legal basis of his claim
from a vindicatio to one premised on enrichment: more specifi-
cally, a condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam, ‘a remedy
available to a plaintiff who innocently transfers money to a
defendant under an agreement which, to the knowledge of the
defendant, is illegal’ (para [10]). He sought to enforce this claim
directly against Absa, W’s bank. In the event, of the seven
respondents only the trustees of W opposed D’s application.
The High Court, per Makgoba J, upheld D’s claim: because D’s
transfer of money into W’s account had been elicited ‘through a
fraud and theft perpetrated on him by W, W had no entitlement,
and thus no claim against Absa, to the money’ (para [12]).
Accordingly, Makgoba J concluded, the money fell outside W’s
estate and was not subject to the concursus creditorum; Absa,
which would be enriched if it retained the money, was obliged to
repay it to D. W’s trustees appealed.
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal (per Cachalia
JA; Lewis JA, Ponnan JA, Theron JA and Petse JA concurring). In
his original affidavits D had claimed to be owner of the funds
deposited into W’s bank account. However, ‘formulated in these
terms, the claim was bad because when money is paid into a
bank account that money becomes the property of the bank’
(para [20]). The rei vindicatio was therefore not available to D.
Where, as in this case, A caused the transfer of money from his
bank account to the account of B, no personal rights were
transferred from A to B; what occurred was that A’s personal claim
to the funds held against his bank was extinguished and a new
personal right created between B and his bank. Ownership of the
money — insofar as money in specie was involved — was
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transferred from the transferring bank to the collecting bank,
which was obliged to account to B in accordance with their
bank–customer contractual relationship. If B were subsequently
sequestrated, then A’s claim would lie against B’s insolvent
estate. Therefore the inquiry in this case turned on whether W had
indeed acquired any personal right to the credit (ie against Absa)
when D caused the money to be transferred. If so, it followed that
the funds had accrued to W’s estate upon sequestration. If not,
the funds would then ‘remain the property of the bank, with W’s
estate having no claim to its payment’ (para [16]). The bank
would be unjustly enriched at D’s expense.
The foundation of the High Court’s decision to uphold D’s claim
was the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nissan South
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marnitz & others (Stand 186 Aeroport (Pty) Ltd
Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA). According to Streicher JA
(para [23]) in that case: ‘If stolen money is paid into a bank
account to the credit of a thief, the thief has as little entitlement to
the credit representing the money so paid into the bank account
as he would have had in respect of the actual notes and coins
paid into the bank account.’ Thus neither the payee nor the
liquidators of the payee’s insolvent estate had any claim to
the stolen money, and because the bank was enriched by its
receipt, ‘it had to release what was left in the payee’s account’
(para [19]).
However, the facts of the Nissan case were significantly
different from those at issue here. In the Nissan case, the payee
had stolen the money: cf the recent comment on that case by
Malan JA in Absa Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Co Ltd 2012 (6)
SA 569 (SCA) para [14]. The same was true in Commissioner of
Customs and Excise v Bank of Lisbon International Ltd 1994 (1)
SA 205 (N). In the words of Thirion J, giving judgment in the
second case, ‘the circumstances under which [the thief] obtained
the money . . . were such as to deprive the delivery of its legal
effect’ (208 of the Bank of Lisbon judgment, quoted by Cachalia
JA para [22]). It followed that the bank acquired ownership of the
money without a corresponding obligation to account to its
customer. Therefore, both Nissan and Bank of Lisbon were
concerned with theft or fraud outside of the contractual context,
ie in the absence of any deliberate conferral by the plaintiff on the
thief. ‘By contrast the investment transaction between D and W,
though tainted by fraud, nevertheless constituted the causa for
the payment. D intended to pay W and voluntarily made the
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payment into W’s account; it is immaterial that the payment was
solicited through W’s misrepresentation and fraud’ (para [23]). It
followed that W acquired an enforceable right against Absa as
soon as the money arrived in his bank account, despite the
absence of a valid underlying agreement. Absa was not enriched
as a result of its receipt of the funds, and no enrichment claim
lay against it. ‘D had only a delictual claim against W arising from
the fraudulent misrepresentation, which induced the transfer
of the money, and on the latter’s sequestration a claim against the
trustees’ (para [24]).
Finally, regarding the concern expressed by Streicher JA in the
Nissan case that the usual remedies open to a creditor (interdicts
and attachments to prevent the debtor’s disposing of his assets)
might not be adequate in the event of a thief’s insolvency, and
that the law was therefore bound to provide a remedy for the
recovery of stolen money directly from the bank in these circum-
stances (para [16] of the Nissan judgment), it appeared from the
distinction drawn above that there were different considerations
at work in the present case.
Admittedly, Cachalia JA’s description in paragraph [24] of D’s
claim against W as exclusively delictual, is unfortunate. Although
a delictual claim against W did indeed arise, the judgment would
have been clearer had the court accepted that D also had a
restitutionary claim arising in enrichment available against W,
namely the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam already
pleaded: see eg, Afrisure CC & another v Watson NO & another
2009 (2) SA 127 (SCA). The court appeared to accept that D,
however foolish, was an innocent victim of W’s unlawful scheme.
But even if a different conclusion had been reached on that point,
this was surely a case in which the par delictum rule would have
been relaxed in favour of the plaintiff and restitution awarded: see
eg Visser en ’n Ander v Roussouw en Andere NNO 1990 (1) SA
139 (A).
That reservation aside, this judgment is to be welcomed insofar
as it greatly clarifies the juristic basis and wider implications of
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Nissan South Africa
(Pty) Ltd v Marnitz & others (Stand 186 Aeroport (Pty) Ltd
Intervening). In particular, the court was clearly right to draw a
fundamental distinction between cases of giving or deliberate
conferral such as this one (‘D intended to pay W and voluntarily
made the payment into W’s account; it is immaterial that the
payment was solicited through W’s misrepresentation and
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fraud’), and cases such as Commissioner of Customs and Excise
v Bank of Lisbon International Ltd, the Nissan case, and Absa
Bank Ltd v Lombard Insurance Co Ltd, which involved taking, ie
the invasion or infringement of the plaintiff’s right to the money by
the thief. In the first kind of case, the recipient of the payment
remains entitled to the money as against his bank, and this
personal claim falls into the recipient’s insolvent estate, leaving
the defrauded transferor a mere concurrent creditor. In the latter
group of cases, the thief acquires no right to the stolen money as
against his own bank, and the victim can recover the money in
the hands of the bank by means of the condictio sine causa
recognised by Thirion J in the Bank of Lisbon case (220),
bypassing the thief’s insolvency.
Finally, Cachalia JA hints at an important normative justification
for this distinction (para [25]). However innocent of fraud, in
deliberately conferring money on another the victim of a Ponzi
scheme tacitly assumes the risk of that other’s insolvency, in that
he chooses to deal with him. The same cannot be said of the
victim of a theft, who is of course wholly passive. It is this point
that explains the different results reached in these two groups of
cases. As one who has voluntarily conferred his assets on
another, albeit in the hope of a lucrative return on his investment,
it is just that the victim of a fraudulent investment scheme share in
the fraudster’s insolvency, whereas the victim of theft is pro-
tected.
CLAIM IN RESPECT OF STOLEN MONEY AGAINST INNOCENT RECIPIENT
(CONDICTIO SINE CAUSA SPECIALIS)
Recovery of identifiable fund remaining in innocent third party’s bank
account
Like the Whitehead decision discussed above, Roestoff v Cliffe
Dekker Hofmeyr Inc 2013 (1) SA 12 (GNP) has helped to clarify
the effect of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decisions in First
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO & others 2001 (3)
SA 960 (SCA) and Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marnitz & others
(Stand 186 Aeroport (Pty) Ltd Intervening) 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA).
R had been the victim of an internet phishing scam as a result of
which R350 000 had been removed from his bank account.
R200 000 of this was subsequently transferred into the trust
account of the defendant firm, CDH, itself innocent of any fraud.
CDH then transferred the resulting credit (minus a handling fee of
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R5 831, 60) to a third party, again without any knowledge of its
true source. R instituted a claim against CDH for R200 000 on
several alternative grounds, one of which was that CDH retained
the amount of R200 000 in its trust account and was obliged to
restore the money to him as its owner.
Du Plessis J dismissed R’s claim. R’s assertion — that he was
the owner of R200 000 in CDH’s trust account and was therefore
entitled to recover it — amounted to a species of rei vindicatio
(vindicatory claim). However, the application of the principles of
the vindicatio in this context was problematic. Although coins and
notes, as movable property, are susceptible to ownership, and
thus in principle recoverable by means of the vindicatio, owner-
ship in stolen money is lost as soon as it is mixed with that of
another. The same is true of stolen money paid into a bank
account: it becomes the property of the bank by operation of law,
and the vindicatio of the original owner falls away. Thus the weight
of authority is in favour of the view that where a thief deposits
money in the bank account of an innocent third party, the victim’s
remedy is not a vindicatory one but arises rather from the
defendant’s enrichment sine causa (without basis): see Absa
Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1998 (1) SA 242
(SCA); First National Bank v Perry (above). Nevertheless, it was
accepted for these purposes (although not held) that the plaintiff
could have succeeded by means of a species of vindicatio if he
could have shown that his money was still identifiable as such in
the defendant’s bank account, at least when action was insti-
tuted. However, at this point the sum of approximately
R194 168,40 which remained after deduction of the defendant’s
fee had long since been paid out of the account, while the fee
itself had been transferred to the defendant’s business account.
The R200 000 received by the defendant was no longer in an
identifiable fund which could be identified with the plaintiff’s
stolen money. As to whether the defendant could be said to have
been enriched in the amount of R5 831,60 (the fee), this had not
been pleaded, nor had it been investigated during the course of
the trial, and under the circumstances it would be unjust to
attempt to decide the matter on the basis of enrichment.
This decision constitutes an important addition to the growing
body of case law concerning the enrichment claim of the victim of
theft against the recipient of stolen money. According to civilian
orthodoxy, the owner of goods, including money, may in principle
vindicate them wherever he finds them, whether from the thief
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himself, or indeed from a good-faith remote recipient. This
vindicatory claim fails, however, where the victim of theft ceases
to be owner of the stolen goods, as a result of consumption,
specification or mixture (in the case of money). It does not seem
that the victim of theft out of a bank account can be said to be
owner of the stolen money at any point after it has been deposited
into another account (see Commissioner of Customs and Excise
v Bank of Lisbon International 213, relied on by Cachalia JA para
[13] of Trustees, Estate Whitehead v Dumas & another 2013 (3)
SA 331 (SCA), discussed above). However, it has long been
established in South African law that the original owner of stolen
money is at least permitted to proceed against such a remote
recipient even after the vindicatio has fallen away by means of an
enrichment action — in particular, the residual condictio sine
causa specialis — provided that the recipient received the stolen
money ex causa lucrativa, gratuitously (Trahair v Webb & Co
1924 WLD 227; Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd
1984 (4) SA 392 (C); Commissioner of Customs and Excise v
Bank of Lisbon International Ltd 1994 (1) SA 205 (N)). Although
not identified as instances of the condictio sine causa specialis,
the claims at issue in Nissan v Marnitz (above) and Absa Bank v
Lombard Insurance Co Ltd 2012 (6) SA 569 (SCA) appear to
have been of this kind.
In fact, it is difficult to speak of ‘ownership’ of money held in a
bank account at all, since the account holder acquires only
personal rights to the funds against his bank (cf again Trustees,
Estate Whitehead v Dumas & another paras [13], [15]). Neverthe-
less, in the words of Thirion J in the Bank of Lisbon case,
‘[a]lthough the relationship between banker and customer is that
of debtor and creditor, the customer has a ‘‘special property or
interest’’ in the money in his bank account’ (see further S v Kotze
1965 (1) SA 118 (A) 125). It is the invasion of or interference with
this ‘special interest’ by the thief that gives rise to the plaintiff’s
claim in a case such as this one — in the words of Du Plessis J, it
is ‘a species of a rei vindicatio’ or substitute vindicatio — and
enables him to pursue ‘his’ money into an identifiable fund (see
Visser Unjustified Enrichment 657–59). Thus where it remains
possible to identify a particular sum currently held to the credit of
the defendant as the proceeds of the sum stolen from the plaintiff,
the plaintiff has a condictio sine causa specialis against the
defendant for its recovery.
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RESTITUTION OF PERFORMANCE UNDER VOID SALE OF LAND
Improvement lien of a bona fide purchaser in respect of necessary and
useful expenses; effect of failure to tender return of purchase price on
seller’s vindicatio
In Rhoode v De Kock & another 2013 (3) SA 123 (SCA), Mr and
Mrs D, the applicants at first instance, had sold residential
property to R, the respondent. The deed of sale contained a
suspensive condition that a loan for the full purchase price, to be
secured by a mortgage bond over the property, would be
obtained by R within a year of the date of signature. R took
possession of the property but the loan was never obtained.
Following the expiry of the one-year period the parties twice
sought to extend the term of the contract by substituting new
dates for the original date of signature. R paid the applicants
R400 000 towards the purchase price. However, the amend-
ments to the deed were initialled only by Mr D, not by Mrs D.
Eventually, some three and a half years after the original sale, Mr
D sent an email to R demanding a guarantee for the purchase
price and threatening to cancel the contract if one were not
produced. R responded with an attorneys’ letter in which it was
alleged that because the suspensive condition had not been
fulfilled, the sale had lapsed; that the parties’ attempts to extend it
had been void due to lack of compliance with both the Matrimo-
nial Property Act 88 of 1984 and the Alienation of Land Act 68 of
1981, in that Mrs D, who was co-owner of the property, had not
signed the amended deed; that R was entitled to recover the
R400 000 paid towards the purchase price; and that he reserved
the right to claim the amount by which the value of the property
had been increased by virtue of improvements made by him. He
continued in occupation.
Three months later the applicants applied for an order in the
magistrate’s court ejecting R from the property. In an affidavit
accompanying the application it was alleged that R had no right
to occupy the property, and that while R’s claim for R400 000 was
conceded, the applicants would counterclaim against him for the
value of his occupation of the property. The improvements to
the property alleged by R were denied, inter alia, on the basis
that they had been effected without permission from the local
authority.
In his answering affidavit R alleged that he was lawfully entitled
to remain in possession of the property by virtue of an improve-
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ment lien. He alleged that he had made improvements to the
property in the belief that the contract was binding and that he
would shortly become owner of the property, ie as a bona fide
possessor, or at least a bona fide occupier. He attached an
estimate, provided by a local builder, of what the improvements
would cost at current market prices. The total assessment
amounted to R1 046 319,97, of which approximately R600 000
represented materials and the rest, labour. Finally, R alleged that
the improvements had ‘substantially increased’ the value of the
property, and that a provisional assessment by a professional
valuer estimated that increase at approximately R500 000. He
denied that the failure to secure advance planning permission
detracted from the value of the improvements, alleging that the
retrospective approval of the local authority would be obtained in
due course.
The application for an order of ejectment was granted. R
appealed to the Western Cape High Court but the appeal was
dismissed by Allie J (Samela J concurring). R then appealed to
the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Cloete JA (Cachalia JA, Bosielo JA, Wallis JA and Pillay JA
concurring) dismissed the appeal. Aside from whether the matter
should be remitted to the magistrate to receive a further set of
affidavits, two issues arose for decision on appeal: first, whether
R had indeed established an improvement lien; and, second,
whether it was fatal to the applicants’ rei vindicatio that they had
not repaid or tendered the repayment of the R400 000 paid by R
towards the purchase price. Regarding the lien, R claimed the
rights of a bona fide purchaser and therefore claimed to be
entitled to recover both necessary and useful expenses. In the
case of necessary expenses, R would be entitled to reimburse-
ment for expenditure of money or materials on the preservation of
the property (Harrison v Marchant 1941 WLD 16). In the case
of useful expenses, the amount of compensation was limited to
the amount by which the value of the property had been
increased, or the amount of the expenditure incurred, whichever
was the lesser (Justinian Digest 6.1.38; Johannes Voet Ad
Pandectas 6.1 n 36; Meyer’s Trustee v Malan 1911 TPD 559;
Fletcher & Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd 1915 AD 636).
However, in neither case had R established that he had actually
expended anything. Nor had he demonstrated satisfactorily that
the value of the property had in fact increased (as was required in
the case of useful improvements). Indeed, there was not even a
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prima facie case for the applicants to meet. To enforce a lien in
these circumstances would be to allow an abuse of the process
of the court.
As for the question of whether the applicants’ failure to tender
restitution of the R400 000 was fatal to their vindicatio, here
counsel for R had argued that, ‘it is an elementary principle of
justice that someone who demands restitution of what he has
performed under a contract, which has been cancelled or has
otherwise failed, must himself restore, or at least tender to
restore, what he received thereunder’ (passage from counsel’s
heads of argument quoted at [20]) and that the applicants’ failure
to make such a tender meant that their cause of action was not
complete: see Bonne Fortune Beleggings Bpk v Kalahari Salt
Works (Pty) Ltd en Andere 1974 (1) SA 414 (NC). It was argued,
further, with reference to Patel v Adam 1977 (2) SA 653 (A), that
although the respondents’ claim was couched in the form of a
vindicatio, they had, as a matter of fact, parted with possession of
the property in terms of a void contract of sale, and that to avoid
an illogical development in the law, they should be required to
tender restitution of what they had received. However, insofar as
the Bonne Fortune case concerned a claim for restitution, it was
distinguishable. In some cases, where there had been full
performance under a void contract, a party would have no option
but to sue for restitution and tender restitution of what she had
received: for example, where money has been paid, or where the
plaintiff is no longer the owner of an article delivered by her under
the contract. But where the vindicatio is available, relief should
not be denied simply because there was another cause of action
available to the respondent or defendant. The mere fact that R
had a claim for the repayment of R400 000 in unjust enrichment,
did not mean that he was entitled to resist ejectment until that
amount had been repaid or tendered: a tender to repay was not a
necessary ingredient in the applicants’ claim. Admittedly, in the
words of Botha J in Vogel NO v Volkersz 1977 (1) SA 537 (T), ‘[i]f
the point is raised by the purchaser, or by the Court mero motu,
the Court will obviously make its order against the purchaser to
restore possession to the seller conditional upon the seller
refunding to the purchaser whatever the latter has paid in respect
of the purchase price of the property, but it is not necessary for
the seller to tender such a refund’ (quoted para [23]). However, R
had already instituted a claim in the High Court for repayment of
the R400 000, while the respondents had asserted a counter-
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claim for the period of R’s occupation, and it was more appropri-
ate for the applicants’ liability to be decided in that context.
Apart from its helpful restatement of the rules regarding
necessary and useful improvements to another’s property by a
bona fide occupier (see eg du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment in
South African Law 274–82), this decision is valuable for its clear
insistence on the distinction between the rei vindicatio and a
personal claim arising from enrichment in the context of a void
contract. Generally speaking, when a party to a contract avoided
for improperly obtained consensus or cancelled due to breach,
seeks restitution of what he has performed, he must restore the
other party to his former position. In other words, it is a precondi-
tion for restitution that the plaintiff restore or tender restitution of
what he has obtained under the contract: see eg Du Plessis
Unjustified Enrichment in South African Law 69–70. This process
of mutual restitution is traditionally referred to as restitutio in
integrum. But where conveyance of the item sold has not yet
occurred, the seller retains ownership of it. His real right can be
asserted prior to any personal right enjoyed by the other party,
without reference to the bilateral context.
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